There is an active scientific debate about the extent of the president`s power to withdraw the United States from its international agreements, with particular emphasis on whether the constitutional barriers to denouncing agreements between Congress and the executive branch are greater than those of the treaty. Footnote 113 The results of this study indicate that in addition to educational issues, an analysis of political economy can also provide valuable lessons. Contrary to the assumptions raised in the previous subsection, several reports indicate that the commitments made in the form of a contract differ qualitatively from those made between Congress and the executive branch. These reports are based on the idea that the treaty, while politically more costly, can also bring some benefits to the parties, which may ultimately lead to a firmer commitment. In the case of interactions where benefits outweigh costs, the contract would then be the preferred instrument, while an executive agreement of Congress would be preferred in others. 79 The case law stipulates that these agreements must only be forwarded to „the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, under an appropriate confidentiality order, which must not be rescinded until after the president has made a formal announcement.” 1 U.S.C. 112b (a) (1979). The use of shelf life as a substitute for force of use is justified for three reasons. Let`s start with another approach to strength of engagement – the ability of an agreement to withstand shocks in the political or economic environment. Footnote 64 The likelihood of shocks increases over time, and agreements are therefore more resistant to changing circumstances, including those that take longer. Therefore, sustainability is also positively correlated with this alternative concept of use force. Second, from a purely practical point of view, the duration of a contract can be measured objectively, while the competing concept of force of engagement would require a number of subjective decisions, such as the severity of the shock and the extent to which the agreement has withstood or has not withstood external pressure. Footnote 65 Third, different theories use interchangeable bonding force and durability concepts, suggesting that both concepts can be considered substitutes.
Footnote 66 Empirical support is provided by Margolis, who analyzes all international agreements concluded from 1943 to 1977 and finds that the distribution of seats in the Senate is very predictable between the treaties and the executive agreements of Congress. Footnote 48 The findings form the basis of the circumvention hypothesis that the choice between contracts and executive agreements is exclusively the function of national legislative assistance.