Despite the seemingly simple arithmetic that reinforces the corresponding adjustments for emissions savings, the ambiguity around Article 6.4 has allowed some parties to insist on options that most other countries believe would be a green light for double counts. The issue of accounting for emission reductions transferred under Article 6.4 remains a major problem. The soundness of the accounting rules is essential so that emissions reductions cannot be counted more than once (double counting) and that the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement is preserved. Another sensitive point is how to deal with quotas produced under the Kyoto Protocol and whether countries can use them under the Paris Agreement. There was no agreement on the introduction of royalties to support adaptation measures, as was the case under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). In the face of these and other disputes, the parties postponed the Article 6 decision until the Glasgow climate change conference. Section 6.2 transactions are subject to a „robust… Avoid double counting,” i.e. each ITMO can only be attributed to the objectives of a country`s „national contribution” (nDC or climate promise).
This is an article distributed under the terms of the Default Default Science Journals license. Perhaps the biggest concern is a system that would allow for „double counting,” meaning that emissions reductions could be blamed on the objectives of the party selling the credits and those who buy them. (Brazil`s position and the issue of double counting are explained below). The Article 6.2 mechanism for trade between countries is relatively lax and few rules or restrictions are established at the international level. It insists, however, that such a trade must be subject to „strong accounting” for the purpose of transparency and to avoid double-counting. Although Article 6.7 stipulates that the annual COP adopts rules, modalities and procedures for the carbon market in accordance with Article 6.4, there is disagreement over the extent of national control over its activities and the UN supervisory body signs each draft or methodology. The OECD/IEA report contains five alternative accounting approaches that are currently being considered for monitoring trade between countries with one- or several-year targets. These are: although this debate may seem rather dry, the choice of a specific accounting approach has the potential to determine whether or not a country is considered its climate objectives. This causes political turmoil in otherwise technical accounting negotiations.
„Otherwise, there will be a double count, which Brazil and many other countries have tried to avoid.” However, towards the end of COP24, in December, the draft text proposed a menu including the following accounting approaches, including the „multi-year trajectory,” the „annual cycle,” the „cumulative” and the „average,” giving countries a choice between the method to be applied. The three separate mechanisms – in accordance with Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8 – were all part of the Paris Agreement, in recognition of the competing interests and priorities between the contracting parties to the agreement. These differences remain and need to be reviewed if the section 6 regulatory framework is to be adopted. Robert Stavins, a professor at Harvard University, argues that these rules „are not necessary for the successful implementation and operation of international bilateral links and the resulting carbon markets,” although there has been no agreement on clear accounting rules under Article 6.2.